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Abstract: In the contemporary biomedical literature, every disease is considered genetic. This 
extension of the concept of genetic disease is usually interpreted either in a trivial or genocentrist sense, 
but it is never taken seriously as the expression of a genetic theory of disease. However, a group of 
French researchers defend the idea of a genetic theory of infectious diseases. By identifying four 
common genetic mechanisms (Mendelian predisposition to multiple infections, Mendelian predisposition 
to one infection, and major gene and polygenic predispositions), they attempt to unify infectious diseases 
from a genetic point of view. In this article, I analyze this explicit example of a genetic theory relying on 
mechanisms and applied only to a specific category of diseases, what we call “a regional genetic theory.” 
I have three aims: to prove that a genetic theory of disease can be devoid of genocentrism, to consider the 
possibility of a genetic theory applied to every disease, and to introduce two hypotheses about the form 
that such a genetic theory could take by distinguishing between a genetic theory of diseases and a genetic 
theory of Disease. Finally, I suggest that network medicine could be an interesting framework for a 
genetic theory of Disease.  
Keywords: Geneticization. Genetic disease. Genocentrism. Causal Selection.  
Disease mechanisms. Disease explanation. Disease theory. 
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Introduction 
The concept of genetic disease has gone through several shifts [1-2]. In the 
1960s, a paradigmatic example of genetic disease was phenylketonuria, a rare, 
monogenic Mendelian, hereditary disorder, for which the equation one mutation = one 
gene = one phenotype was explicitly assumed. But the following years witnessed three 
major changes resulting in the collapse of this model. First, the core of the concept of 
monogenic Mendelian disease [3] was called into question by different scientific 
discoveries, such as allelic heterogeneity (several allelic mutations of the same locus 
can cause the disease), locus heterogeneity (several genes can cause the same disease), 
and modifier genes (most monogenic disorders are also influenced by the intervention 
of other genes) [4]. Secondly, there has been an increasing interest in the genetics of 
common, non-hereditary and polygenic disorders, such as cancer or diabetes. Finally, 
the development of bioinformatics, rapid DNA sequencing techniques (such as 
recombinant DNA technology, sequencing by hybridization and whole-genome 
sequencing), and “big science” projects such as the Human Genome Project have led to 
an extraordinary upsurge of genetic data and of gene-disease correlations. So, while the 
concept of genetic disease originally designated a very restricted class of rare, 
Mendelian, hereditary, monogenic disorders, nowadays it encompasses common, non-
Mendelian, non-hereditary, polygenic disorders to the point where every disease seems 
to be genetic. Abby Lippman has coined the word “geneticization” to describe this 
phenomenon of understanding all diseases as the result of genes [5]. 
Two related but distinct issues arise here: what is a genetic disease and is the 
geneticization of diseases legitimate? A common strategy for addressing these 
questions, shared by several philosophers [6-9], is to begin by approaching the project 
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of defining the concept of genetic disease as an instance of the causal selection problem 
[10], which consists in picking out the main cause of an event occurring in a 
multicausal context. Applied to the problem of genetic disease, this means that labeling 
a disease “genetic” implies that genes are the most important cause in disease 
explanation. If we understand the concept of genetic disease in the context of the causal 
selection problem, geneticization can then be understood as an expansion of the concept 
of genetic disease to all diseases. In that case, geneticization amounts to an acceptance 
of genocentrism—the belief that genes are the most important causal factor in 
explaining any biological phenomenon. Genocentrism, however, has already been 
heavily criticized [6-9]. I will not review here the numerous arguments against 
genocentrism. It is enough to say that genocentrism seems to be both scientifically 
unjustified and ethically questionable. Since geneticization, on this causal selection 
understanding of the term, is identifiable with genocentrism, it follows that 
geneticization cannot be an acceptable approach to disease. These philosophers, 
therefore, attempt to give a more restricted account of genetic disease, whereby it 
addresses the causal selection problem without leading to the pervasive geneticization 
of disease. They do this by defining the concept of genetic disease strictly in an attempt 
to distinguish between diseases that are “true” genetic diseases, where genes are 
necessary and sufficient to cause the disease (usually the Mendelian monogenic 
diseases), and diseases where gene-environment interactions are more difficult to assess 
(usually the polygenic disorders). 
At this point, some scientific issues with the concept of genetic disease [1-4], to 
which I alluded above arise again: there are few, if any, “true” Mendelian monogenic 
diseases and the frontier between monogenic and polygenic diseases gets increasingly 
blurred. So, while the problems of geneticization and genocentrism are avoided, the 
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result is an overly restrictive and unclear meaning of the concept of genetic disease. 
One response at this point might be to abandon the concept of genetic disease. Is it truly 
useful? Pragmatism is sometimes invoked to explain this lingering attachment to the 
concept of genetic disease [11], but which pragmatic reasons and pragmatic for whom? 
I noted above the scientific difficulties encountered with the concept of genetic disease. 
From a clinical point of view too, it is unclear what purpose the concept serves. It does 
not guide genetic testing or genetic counseling (where the notion of “inherited disease” 
is more useful), nor does it define diseases that are targets for genetic therapy (as 
Caplan has pointed out [12]), nor does it pick out diseases that need special funding 
because of their rarity (“orphan” or “rare” diseases would be more useful concepts for 
this purpose). 
I noted above how geneticization was abandoned in an attempt to salvage the 
concept of genetic disease and that the key move in this analysis was to approach the 
matter through the causal selection problem. However, since there seems to be little 
point in saving the concept of genetic disease, perhaps one can salvage the concept of 
geneticization. Of course, I do not mean “geneticization” understood as essentially 
equivalent to genocentrism, which, as I noted, is subject to significant objections. 
Rather, I suggest a meaningful interpretation of geneticization that bypasses the issue of 
causal selection. Rather than interpreting geneticization as an expansion of the concept 
of genetic disease, I propose that geneticization be understood as the development of a 
common mechanistic explanation for the genetic side of diseases, what we call “a 
genetic theory of disease.” This account is definitely not genocentrist—by no means 
would I wish to suggest that genes are the most important factor in causal explanations 
of all diseases. Indeed, the account I will propose embraces interactionism and 
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acknowledges a multicausal model of disease causation for every disease. No disease 
can be understood without appealing to both genes and environment.  
But, if the theory stops at this point, it has moved only from genocentrism to 
weak interactionism, and that is not a very interesting achievement. Indeed, weak 
interactionism is probably true but certainly trivial: it does not tell us anything truly 
meaningful about causal explanations of diseases. Furthermore, there is still the 
lingering temptation to come back to the causal selection problem and to view diseases 
on a causal continuum where both genes and environment would play a part in causing 
every disease but where some diseases would still be “more genetic” or “more 
environmental” than others. That is why, in this article, I propose a first step towards a 
strong and meaningful interactionism. This strong interactionism asserts that diseases 
share some common genetic mechanisms in their development and tries to assess which 
types of genetic mechanisms are at play in disease explanation. In this kind of account, 
it does not make sense to consider some mechanisms “more genetic” than others. 
Rather, one can identify various mechanisms that could provide an interesting basis to 
reclassify diseases according to the type of mechanisms that they exhibit, thus 
providing a new way of understanding disease causation.  
To make sense of the evolution of contemporary biomedical science, the best 
method may be to take the recent biomedical literature as a starting point. I will focus 
on the genetic theory of infectious diseases, one of the rare examples of an explicit 
genetic theory [13]. This theory is defended by a small but renowned group of scientists 
and aims to unify infectious diseases around the identification of four common genetic 
mechanisms. Therefore, I will first describe the structure of this genetic theory of 
infectious diseases before discussing the benefits and limits of this approach. From this 
genetic theory, which is restricted to a specific class of diseases (a “regional” genetic 
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theory), I will try to introduce two hypotheses about the form that a general genetic 
theory could take by distinguishing between a genetic theory of diseases and a genetic 
theory of Disease. Finally, I will suggest that network medicine could provide an 
interesting framework for developing a genetic theory of Disease.  
The example of the genetic theory of infectious 
diseases  
From germ theory to the genetic theory of infectious diseases  
Infectious diseases were born as an independent entity at the end of the 
nineteenth century with the development of germ theory. This is best captured by the 
four Henle-Koch postulates [14], which state that for an agent to be considered the 
infectious cause of a disease, it must fulfill the following conditions:  
(1) the agent must be present in all cases of the disease;  
(2) the agent must be isolated from someone with the disease and grown in pure 
culture; 
(3) inoculation into a susceptible organism of the agent—from a pure culture—
must produce the disease; 
(4) the agent must be recovered from the infected–inoculated organism and 
grown again in culture. 
In the years following the establishment of these postulates, several issues 
raised by germ theory have been pointed out [15]. I will concentrate here on two 
specific difficulties. First, the third postulate cannot account for the problem of 
asymptomatic carriers. For example, it cannot explain the fact that of the over one 
hundred people infected by the influenza virus, only ten will develop the flu. The 
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“agent” of a given disease can be inoculated in an organism and yet fail to produce the 
disease in the infected organism. Secondly, these postulates do not address the question 
of the inter-individual variability of the symptoms. The example of leprosy is 
particularly telling on this point [16]. Leprosy has two main clinical subtypes: the 
paucibacillary form and the multibacillary form. Whereas in the paucibacillary form, 
there is a limited number of hypopigmented and anesthesic lesions without any 
microscopically discernable bacteria, the multibacillary form exhibits numerous 
sensitive or anesthesic lesions with high bacillary loads. In the nineteenth century, G.A. 
Hansen identified the agent responsible for these two forms of leprosy as 
Mycobacterium leprae, thus giving leprosy its other name, “Hansen’s disease.” How 
can the same pathogen be responsible for two different clinical subtypes of diseases that 
receive two different types of treatment and do not have the same prognosis? To some 
extent, the first problem can be understood as a limiting case of the second: the problem 
is explaining how the same pathogen inoculated in different organisms can produce so 
many different subtypes of the same disease, from completely asymptomatic to severe 
forms.  
It is precisely in order to fill this explanatory gap that the genetic theory of 
infectious diseases has been designed. “The field of human genetics of infectious 
disease aims to define the genetic variations accounting for inter-individual variability 
in the course of human infections” [13, p. 915]. Infectious diseases, then, are no longer 
understood as purely environmental diseases, but also as determined in part by genetic 
factors, thus stepping out of the monocausal model to an explanation of infectious 
diseases in general that can fit both the individual and population levels. The genetic 
theory of disease is not incompatible with and does not try to refute the germ theory. 
Nor does the genetic theory claim to be a complete picture of inter-individual clinical 
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variability. In fact, Jean-Laurent Casanova, Laurent Abel, and Alexandre Alcaïs 
acknowledged at least three other theories that contribute to a global explanation of 
inter-individual clinical variability. [17, p.404] For instance, the genetics of the microbe 
itself (some bacteria may carry antibiotic resistance genes or specific virulence genes) 
should be taken into account for understanding that the “same” infectious disease can 
be more severe in some individuals than others. Non-microbial environmental factors 
may also be involved, with air temperature or humidity and the availability of an animal 
vector being particularly crucial (the ecological theory of infection). Finally, non-
genetic host factors, such as age or, in the last century, personal vaccination history 
may have a key role (the immunological theory of infection) [17, p. 404]. 
Indeed, the genetic theory of infectious diseases does not even aim to provide a 
complete picture of the causal factors involved in the pathogenesis of infectious 
diseases. While acknowledging other possible factors at play, it only focuses on the 
genetic mechanisms of infectious diseases. To put it differently, the genetic theory of 
infectious diseases only aims at providing an explanation of “the genetic host-side” of 
infectious diseases. 
The proponents of a genetic theory of infectious diseases 
Evidence supporting the genetic theory of infectious diseases first came from 
observations of familial aggregations of both rare and common infections, and also 
from follow-up studies of adoptive children and twins. Nevertheless, with the exception 
of a few diseases, genetic susceptibility to infections was poorly understood until the 
completion of the Human Genome Project [18].  
This may explain why, even if the involvement of genes in the host reaction to 
infectious diseases was implicitly recognized by every infectious disease specialist, 
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only a small group of researchers explicitly theorized this involvement. These 
researchers are mainly Casanova, Alcaïs, and Abel. They worked in the laboratory of 
human genetics of infectious diseases at Necker Hospital Medicine School in Paris, and 
they have written approximately thirty articles over the last thirty years to defend this 
theory. My account of the genetic theory of infectious diseases will rest on two of their 
most recent and explicit articles [13,19] and on a chapter titled “Human Genetics of 
Infectious Diseases,” which they published in a reference book on human genetics in 
2010 [17].  In these three papers, they attempt to unify infectious diseases from a 
genetic point of view by identifying four genetic mechanisms.  
Before describing these mechanisms, however, one should note that the 
scientists who wrote these papers explicitly use the term “mechanisms,” a term that will 
be discussed in more detail later in this article.  
Description of four mechanisms 
1. Mendelian predisposition to multiple infections: mutations in one gene cause 
susceptibility to multiple infections. For example, the X-linked agammaglobulinemia is 
caused by mutations in the Bruton’s tyrosine kinase gene. This gene plays an essential 
role in the maturation of B cells in the bone marrow. When mutated, immature B-
lymphocytes cannot develop into functional B cells, thus causing susceptibility to 
multiple bacterial infections at early stages of the infected male’s life.  This is also 
referred to as “conventional primary immunodeficiency” (conventional PID). 
2. Mendelian predisposition to one infection: mutations in one gene cause 
susceptibility to one infection.  Take, for example, Herpes Simplex Encephalitis (HSE): 
Herpes Simplex Virus-1 (HSV1) infects around 80% of the population, but only a small 
fraction will develop HSE, which still remains the most common form of sporadic 
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encephalitis in Western countries. The diseased people have an autosomal recessive 
UNC93B deficiency. This deficiency impairs the recognition of RNA intermediates of 
HSV1 in the central nervous system, resulting in impaired interferon production and 
causing enhanced viral replication and cell death. The diseases in this category are also 
called “novel primary immunodeficiencies” (new PIDs), as they were discovered after 
the conventional PIDs, which were Mendelian predispositions to multiple infections.  
3. Major gene / Resistance to one infection: the “major gene” or “major locus” 
concept was developed in the context of complex segregation analysis in order to 
understand the phenomenon of incomplete penetrance. Penetrance is the frequency of 
individuals carrying a particular allele that also express an associated trait. For a given 
disease causing mutation, penetrance can be incomplete, meaning, only a portion of the 
people having the given allele will exhibit the corresponding disease. A major gene 
creates the immunodeficiency, but its penetrance may be lowered due to the combined 
effect of other genes and the environment. The main assumption is that only one 
mutated gene causes the corresponding disease but other genes or environmental factors 
may influence the expression of this gene, thus, explaining its variable penetrance. The 
concept of “resistance” mirrors the major gene concept: some specific mutations on a 
given allele confer resistance to a given pathogen because they result in the lack of 
expression of receptors needed by the invading microbes. For example, consider the 
case of malaria caused by Plasmodium vivax. P. vivax is one of the pathogens that 
cause malaria. To penetrate into the blood cells, P.vivax needs to fix onto a Duffy blood 
group chemokine coreceptor, called DARC and located at the surface of the 
erythrocytes. A single nucleotide mutation on the promoter of the DARC gene prevents 
the expression of the DARC receptor at the cell surface, conferring a resistance to 
malaria caused by P. vivax.  
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4. Polygenic predisposition to one or multiple infections: Polygenic inheritance 
differs from the major gene concept. It implies that the global phenotype results not 
from one single gene influenced by other genes or the environment, but from the 
combined effects of a large number of loci. Depending on the number and relative 
impact of the genes influencing disease, we may distinguish between oligogenic 
predisposition and “true” polygenic predisposition. Oligogenicity implies that the 
phenotype is dependant on two or a few major genes, while other genetic loci make a 
relatively lower contribution. In “true” polygenic inheritance, no major gene is involved 
and the occurrence of disease depends on a large number of genetic loci, each making a 
small contribution. These four mechanisms are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Four mechanisms in the genetic theory of infectious diseases 
MECHANISM DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE 
Mendelian 
predisposition to 
multiple infections  
One gene, complete 
penetrance, multiple 
infections 
X-linked agammaglobulinemia: 
Mutations in Bruton’s tyrokinase gene 
⇒ immature B lymphocytes ⇒ multiple 
bacterial infections 
Mendelian 
predisposition to one 
infection  
 
One gene, complete 
penetrance, one 
infection 
Herpes Simplex Encephalitis:  
Autosomal recessive UNC93B 
deficiency ⇒ impaired recognition of 
HSV1 by the CNS ⇒ impaired 
production of interferon 
⇒ viral replication in the CNS  
Major gene / Resistance 
to one infection  
One major gene, high 
penetrance, one 
infection 
Malaria caused by P. vivax:  
Mutations in the promoter of DARC 
gene ⇒ lack of DARC coreceptor of 
P.vivax ⇒ P. vivax cannot enter 
erythrocytes (resistance)  
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From common genetic mechanisms to the concept of 
genetic continuum  
Common genetic mechanisms 
With four genetic mechanisms at play in the inter-individual clinical variability 
of infectious diseases, one might expect infectious diseases to be split into four 
mutually exclusive categories, each defined by its own genetic mechanism. In fact, 
however, the categories overlap to create a continuum. Indeed, the previously described 
mechanisms are said to be common, meaning that the same disease can combine two or 
Polygenic 
predisposition to one or 
multiple infection(s)  
Multiple genes, low 
penetrance, one or 
multiple infection(s) 
HLA associated infections 
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three mechanisms. As an example, genetic predisposition to tuberculosis, which was 
previously considered to be purely polygenic, was recently shown also to reflect a 
Mendelian predisposition to one infection in some patients and a major gene effect in 
others [20, 21]. It is precisely because these mechanisms are not the property of a 
specific category of diseases that there are non-mutually exclusive classes of diseases 
and that one can talk about a mechanistic continuum and not of a simple typology. The 
term “continuum” must be understood here in its usual mathematical sense. It indicates 
that the genetic differences between infectious diseases are not discrete, but just a 
matter of degree. This concept of continuum is well represented in various figures in 
the articles of Alcaïs, Abel, and Casanova [13, 17, 19], a version of one of which 
appears below (Fig. 1).  
  
Fig. 1: Schematic representation of the genetic continuum of infectious diseases (adapted 
from [19]). The ordinate is the number of infections at risk of development. The abscissa is the number of 
genes at play. Allelic penetrance is represented by the triangle above the graph: when just one or a major 
gene is involved, penetrance is high. Conversely, when multiple genes are involved, each gene has a 
limited effect on the global phenotype and penetrance is lower. Finally, the shades of gray (from dark 
gray to light gray) represent the genetic continuum between infectious diseases and are also highly 
correlated with allelic penetrance as suggested by the common color code. Four diseases are represented 
on this graph exemplifying the four previously described genetic mechanisms in infectious diseases. 
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A new concept of genetic continuum  
This is a rather new way of representing the concept of genetic continuum. 
Genetic diseases are represented in a very different manner, for example, in a textbook 
published by the National College of French Teachers and Practitioners of Medical 
Genetics (CNEPGM) in 2004 [22]. The graph, entitled “joint action of genetic and 
environmental factors in diseases,” consists of a single line, made of three segments 
(black, gray, and white), each corresponding to a specific disease category. The black 
segment represents “the diseases that are mostly genetic,” whereas the white segment 
represents “the diseases that are mostly environmental.” Between these two extremes is 
a gradation of gray, indicating diseases in which both genetic and environmental factors 
are at play but in different proportions. In other words, this is a typical representation of 
a genetic continuum as framed by the “causal selection problem.” Some diseases are 
more genetic than others, and the main issue at stake is to determine the proportions in 
which genetic and environmental factors interact. In this kind of genetic continuum, the 
previous examples of infectious diseases will probably be on the “mostly 
environmental” side of the graph.   
The genetic continuum represented in Figure 1 differs from the CNEPGM 
version in two aspects. First, the causal selection problem is not an issue—there is no 
distinction between diseases based on how much genes and environment influence their 
phenotypes. Indeed, the continuous gradation of gray represents allelic penetrance, that 
is, the fraction of people having the gene(s) and the corresponding disease. A disease 
with lower penetrance is not a disease with less genetic influence. Indeed, polygenic 
inheritance does not suppose less genetic influence than Mendelian predisposition. It is 
only a difference in the way genes cause the disease. In Mendelian predisposition, one 
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gene is responsible for the disease whereas in polygenic inheritance several genes are 
responsible together.  
Second, whereas it is impossible to distinguish between different causal 
mechanisms for the same disease on the traditional representation of the genetic 
continuum, it is absolutely possible in the kind of representations used by Abel, Alcaïs, 
and Casanova. For example, tuberculosis should appear in at least three different points 
of Figure 1 since it can be caused by at least three different genetic mechanisms, as 
previously mentioned.  
Consequences of the genetic continuum 
What are the epistemological consequences of this mechanistic continuum? 
First, it provides a unifying explanation of inter-individual clinical variability from a 
genetic point of view. It is assumed that for each infectious disease, one or more of 
these mechanisms can be instantiated to explain why a fraction of the infected 
individuals exhibit symptoms while others stay asymptomatic. So, the mechanistic 
continuum exhibited by the genetic theory of infectious diseases represents an 
important gain in our understanding of the pathogenesis of infectious diseases, 
compared to the germ theory, which did not provide an explanation for the 
phenomenon of inter-individual clinical variability and could not account for the 
problem of asymptomatic carriers or variations in the symptoms exhibited by 
individuals.  
Not only does the genetic continuum of infectious diseases provide a unifying 
background that accounts for inter-individual clinical variability, it also provides a 
satisfactory explanation of infectious diseases at both the individual and population 
levels. The germ theory could only provide an explanation for individuals who have 
tuberculosis because they have been infected by Mycobacterium tuberculosis. On the 
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other hand, the genetic theory of infectious diseases allows two kinds of explanations.  
At the population level, it allows a general account of every genetic mechanism implied 
in the predisposition to a given disease. In this case, some individuals develop 
tuberculosis because they have either a Mendelian predisposition to Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis or a major gene effect. But at the individual level, it would be theoretically 
possible to distinguish between these different mechanisms to explain why an 
individual, in a particular case, developed tuberculosis.  
Is this genetic theory a real mechanistic explanation?  
Preliminary comments on the concept of “mechanism” 
Now that I have presented the main contents of the genetic theory of infectious 
diseases, I will comment on the term “mechanisms,” which is explicitly used by Abel, 
Alcaïs, and Casanova but may raise some justified concerns for those who are familiar 
with the recent debates about the definition of mechanisms and their relevance to 
biological explanations [23]. These debates refer to Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s 
definitive characterization of mechanisms, which comes from their classic paper 
published in 2000, “Thinking about Mechanisms” [24]. The so-called “MDC account” 
of mechanisms has become the received philosophical view of mechanisms in recent 
years, superseding other attempted definitions. The account has even crossed over into 
the scientific community, making the original MDC paper the most-cited paper ever 
published in Philosophy of Science. The MDC account characterizes biological 
mechanisms as “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set up conditions to termination or finish conditions” [24, 
p. 3]. 
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The genetic theory of infectious diseases does, to an extent, have the entities 
called for in the MDC account in the form of genes or diseases. It also seems that a 
regular organization between entities and activities is assumed in each mechanism 
between genes and the development of diseases. Still, these are not the entities and 
forms of organization expected when one speaks of “genetic mechanisms.” When 
talking about “genetic mechanisms”, one expects to be confronted with molecular 
activities, such as DNA replication and transcription, regulatory networks of gene 
expression, and so on. Do the mechanisms described above really deserve to be called 
“genetic” mechanisms? Indeed, are they even specific enough to be considered 
mechanisms at all?  
Imprecise activities, missing entities and problematic concepts  
There are three specific critiques that can be seen to expand on the questions 
raised in the last paragraph. First, as I pointed out, the described mechanisms are 
imprecise. For a genetic mechanism, one may expect a detailed molecular description. 
For example, the description of the fourth mechanism, that is, the polygenic 
predisposition to one or multiple infections, clearly remains vague. Indeed, the 
identification of a truly polygenic predisposition requires a large number of individuals, 
both because of the small expected effect attributable to each gene and because of the 
additive nature of these genetic effects. This may explain why evidence of such genetic 
mechanisms at both the population and individual levels has only been provided by 
studies of susceptibility to infectious diseases in animal models of experimental 
infectious diseases, and has yet to be provided by human studies. The description of the 
third mechanism, “major gene / resistance to one infection,” suffers similar 
shortcomings. Very little is said about how other genes and the environment may affect 
the expression of the major gene.  
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Secondly, one could argue that the genetic theory of infectious diseases does not 
take into account some entities involved in the inter-individual clinical variability of 
infectious diseases, especially the genetics of the microbiome and the genetics of the 
pathogen [25]. On the one hand, the microbiome is the complex community of bacteria, 
archaea, eukaryotes, and viruses that infect humans and live permanently in our bodies. 
It is firmly believed that the genetics of this microbiome interacts with our immune 
system, thus modulating its response to infections. On the other hand, the genetics of 
the pathogen itself are probably of great importance to understanding inter-individual 
clinical variability; different individuals of the same pathogen species do not 
necessarily carry the same type of resistance to antibiotics, the same genes of virulence, 
etc. It is not that the genetic theory of infectious diseases developed by Casanova, Abel, 
and Alcaïs is not incompatible with these theories; it just does not mention them.  
Thirdly, one may question the concepts chosen for describing these 
mechanisms. Indeed, concepts such as “Mendelian predisposition” or “monogenic” are 
borrowed from classical human genetics. But, as has already been suggested above, 
these concepts are not as straightforward as they may seem, since several of them have 
been challenged recently. Indeed, non-Mendelian modes of inheritance have been 
discovered [26], and monogenic disease is no longer considered a simple category [27].  
Mechanism sketches?  
These objections are not so much obstacles to a mechanistic description of the 
genetic theory of infectious diseases as a problem of the degree of explanation—
molecular mechanisms are not so much absent here as implicit. What the proponents of 
the genetic theory of infectious diseases propose is neither the explanation of a specific 
case of genetic susceptibility for a given infectious disease (in which case the described 
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entities and activities would be more specific), nor is it a complete general description 
of the molecular level of each mechanism (in which case one could expect some 
general schema to describe each mechanism). As the theory itself is a work in progress 
(some of these mechanisms, such as “Mendelian resistance,” have only been recently 
described), the description is necessarily incomplete. It still constitutes, however, what 
Craver would describe as a “mechanism sketch.”   
A sketch is an abstraction for which bottom out entities and activities 
cannot (yet) be supplied or which contains gaps in its stages. The productive 
continuity from one stage to the next has missing pieces, black boxes, which we 
do not know yet how to fill [24, p.18]. Thus, the mechanisms of the genetic 
theory of infectious diseases seem closer to mechanism sketches than to a 
complete mechanistic description of genetic susceptibility in infectious diseases. 
However, even mechanism sketches have a purpose: they constitute heuristic 
tools designed to indicate what further work needs to be done to get a better 
mechanistic explanation. More importantly, the incompleteness of this theory 
does not weaken my main argument, as I am not so much interested here in the 
genetic theory of infectious diseases itself as in the conclusions that one can draw 
from such an example of a regional genetic theory.  
What about the genetic theory of diseases in general?  
What about a genetic theory of disease in general?  
The genetic theory of infectious diseases is an example of what a regional 
genetic theory, that is, a genetic theory that applies only to a specific group of diseases, 
could look like. With the genetic theory of infectious diseases, I considered the example 
of a genetic theory devoid of genocentrism that relies on four common genetic 
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mechanisms (or mechanism sketches) to unify infectious diseases from a genetic point 
of view. However, the aim was not the extension of the concept of genetic disease to 
infectious diseases, but its extension to any disease. What is of interest is a genetic 
theory of disease in general, which could apply to any category of disease. One can 
consider two ways to progress from this example of a regional genetic theory to a more 
general theory. One is to progress to a genetic theory of diseases, and the other is to 
move on to a genetic theory of Disease.  
My distinction between a genetic theory of diseases and a genetic theory of 
Disease derives from Paul Thagard’s history of medical theories [28]. In this history, 
Thagard makes a clear distinction between “ancient” medical theories and modern 
ones. Every ancient theory, such as humoral medicine, traditional Chinese medicine, or 
traditional Indian medicine, relies on a general definition of Disease as an imbalance 
(even if the nature of this imbalance differs from one ancient theory to another). 
Conversely modern medicine emerged with the development of the microbial theory 
that identifies a specific cause for a specific class of diseases. Later, other specific 
theories for other classes of diseases arose, giving birth to our current medical theory, 
which is a collection of different theories for different classes of diseases. So there is a 
clear opposition between the ancient theories, which are general theories of Disease in 
this respect, and our modern medical theory, which is a collection of distinct theories 
for different classes of diseases. The distinction between “diseases” and “Disease” does 
not bear any ontological commitment. It only aims to distinguish between two different 
kinds of disease explanations: explaining diseases as distinct, individual, and separate 
entities, or trying to find common biological features to the concept of disease.  
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Representing a genetic theory of diseases and a genetic theory of 
Disease   
 By applying the distinction between a general theory of Disease and theories of 
diseases made by Thagard to the search for a genetic theory, one ends up with two 
different possibilities—a genetic theory of diseases and a genetic of Disease, as 
represented in Figures 2 and 3.  
 
          
Fig. 2: Typical representation of a genetic theory of diseases. The genetic theory of diseases 
is a set of regional genetic theories. For each category of diseases, there is a specific genetic theory with 
specific mechanisms. Genetic mechanisms may differ for each class of diseases. This kind of theory does 
not change the way we classify diseases.  
 
            
Fig. 3: Typical representation of a genetic theory of Disease. In a genetic theory of Disease, 
we may expect a genetic definition of Disease in general. Depending on this definition, some 
classificatory principles would appear and these principles would likely renew the way we classify 
diseases.  
 
The first diagram (Fig. 2) is a representation of what we may call a genetic 
theory of diseases. It is a set of regional genetic theories, an extension of the example 
of the genetic theory of infectious diseases. Each regional theory would be defined 
either by distinct and specific genetic mechanisms (each regional theory would have its 
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own genetic mechanisms) or by applying the same kinds of genetic mechanisms for 
each regional theory. These mechanisms could use similar concepts as those in the 
example of the genetic theory of infectious diseases, provided these concepts (e.g., 
Mendelian inheritance, monogenic disease) have been clarified in the meantime. In this 
approach, each category of diseases as we know it now (autoimmune diseases, 
infectious diseases, cardiovascular diseases, and so on) would remain the same, except 
for the elucidation of the genetic components of their physiopathology.  
The second diagram (Fig. 3) represents what would be a genetic theory of 
Disease in general. In such an approach, it is the very definition of Disease that is likely 
to change and to receive a genetic interpretation. If there were a genetic definition of 
disease, one would expect radical changes in the way diseases are classified. For 
example, one might expect the re-classification of the disease categories, as currently 
known, into new subclasses of diseases that are yet to be defined. The idea of a genetic 
definition of Disease is still theoretical, but there are some hints towards such an idea, 
e.g., in network medicine [29]. 
Network medicine: a genetic theory of Disease?  
Network theory is a set of solid mathematical and computational methods 
developed to decipher the underlying architecture behind apparently anarchic networks, 
such as the World Wide Web, social networks, and biological networks. Network 
medicine was born of the synthesis between network theory, genomic medicine, and 
systems biology. Network medicine aims to develop network-based approaches to 
disease by analyzing the interactions between different kinds of genomic networks in a 
given disease and between apparently distinct pathophenotypes.  
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The core of network medicine relies mainly on two biological properties of the 
cell: interconnectivity and functional redundancy [30]. The interconnectivity of the cell 
components implies that disease can never been understood as the result of a single 
mutation in a single gene. On the contrary, disease is defined as a perturbation in a 
functional module, that is, in a complex network of intra- and extra- cellular 
components (genes, transcription factors, proteins, etc.) that interact to achieve a 
specific function. But a single perturbation in a functional module does not necessarily 
imply the occurrence of the disease. Indeed, the disorganization of a functional module 
does not necessarily lead to its inactivation. It can also lead to a rerouting of the 
function or to a less efficient achievement of the function. Moreover, most cellular 
functions depend not on a single functional module but on several—a property called 
“functional redundancy”—which contributes to the robustness of the function. If a 
single mutation or a single environmental perturbation could breakdown a functional 
module, humans would be permanently ill. But there is some robustness in the way our 
bodies are able to adjust to a certain level of stress and genetic or lifestyle-induced 
perturbations. Based on this functional redundancy, disease can be defined in a more 
specific way. A disease is a dynamic and complex phenomenon that occurs with the 
progressive inactivation of several functional modules initially used to achieve the 
function.  
In what sense can network medicine be considered a theory of Disease? First, 
this definition of disease is supposed to apply to most (if not all1) diseases. There is a 
common definitional framework for every disease, which is the first requirement of a 
theory of Disease, unlike a theory of diseases, which is merely a collection of disease 
                                                
1 The application of this framework is easy to imagine for most monogenic and 
complex diseases, including the infectious diseases I discussed above. It may 
prove difficult for some specific cases, such as environmental poisoning or brutal 
accidents. That said, defining these cases as diseases may itself be problematic.  
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classes whose mechanisms or explanatory frameworks may differ from one class to 
another.  
Second, from such a perspective, the explanandum of disease explanation 
changes. Our current classification of disease delineates diseases based on similar 
phenotypes and symptoms, neglecting the different ways in which the same disease can 
occur. Network medicine, by contrast, aims to identify disease in a more specific and 
sensitive way. For each disease a functional subnetwork (the entire set of redundant 
functional modules) is identified and based on this modular identification, a disease can 
be defined in its preclinical state and in an unequivocal way. Moreover, the aim is not 
to explain separately the occurrence of every disease but to understand how diseases are 
functionally related to each other. Diseases themselves have intertwined relationships 
and are understood as functionally related entities, since different diseases may share 
some components in the composition of their module and the failure of one functional 
module in a disease A can have an influence on the disorganization of one of the 
functional modules of disease B. It is based on these hypotheses that the proponents of 
network medicine hope to explain not only comorbidity (for example, the relationship 
between obesity, metabolic syndrome, and cardiovascular diseases) but also syndrome 
families and the extraordinary importance of some genes in common diseases [31]. 
Searching for a common origin to different individual diseases can thus be considered a 
step toward a theory of Disease.   
Third, network medicine may completely change the way we classify diseases 
[32]. What matters here is not the main organ disturbed by diseases, as in most of the 
anatomo-clinical classifications, nor is it the identification of a main cause (infectious, 
genetic, autoimmune). What matters is the identification of a given module composed 
of genetic and non-genetic components at the cellular level. It is still not clear on which 
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classificatory principles network medicine would rely since a functional subnetwork is 
supposed to be specific for a given disease. Therefore, to some extent, classifying 
diseases into classes or categories does not make sense and each disease is a class of its 
own (identified by a unique functional subnetwork). Still, in this respect, network 
medicine seems closer to a theory of Disease, which is supposed to renew our disease 
categories, than to a theory of diseases, which keeps our disease classification and our 
disease categories intact.   
This explains why network medicine might be considered a theory of Disease 
and not a theory of diseases. But in what sense is this theory of Disease genetic? And in 
what sense is it a general framework, or at least a first step toward a strong 
interactionism in disease explanation?  
Both genocentrism and weak interactionism approach the multicausal model of 
disease explanation as a binary choice between genes and environment, with options 
being defined in a rather loose way. In network medicine, this multicausal model is 
refined, and genes and environment are defined in a stricter way, thus offering a more 
fine-grained causal background for an interactionist disease-explanation. Human 
disease genes are all those genes known to be involved in diseases, but not every gene 
is a human disease gene. For example, essential genes that are involved in key cellular 
functions or key developmental features cannot be human disease genes, since 
mutations in these essential genes are usually lethal in utero. There are other biological 
properties of human disease genes [33, 34], but I cannot review them here in detail. I 
only want to observe that network medicine accounts for the fact that not all genes have 
the same functional role in a cell [35]. Different types of environment are 
acknowledged as well. For example, some proponents of network medicine distinguish 
between the environment E, which designates external environmental modifiers 
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commonly shared between individuals close to each other (such as nutriments, 
bioclimatic conditions, or pollutants), and the environment E’, which designates a more 
internal environment, depending on the individual history, epigenetics, intrinsic 
stochasticity, and which is strictly independent of the genotype [30]. This distinction 
between E and E’ is necessary to understand how two monozygous twins raised in a 
similar environment may have a different set of functional modules at some point in 
their life. Not only does network medicine provide a framework for us to redefine the 
initially unsatisfying dichotomy between genes and environment in disease explanation, 
it also allows a redefinition of the distinction between Mendelian monogenic diseases 
and polygenic disorders. Indeed, the causal selection problem was deeply entangled 
with an unsatisfying account of Mendelian monogenic diseases, in which genes are 
necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of disease, and of polygenic diseases, in 
which genes and environment interact in a more complex way. In network medicine, 
Mendelian monogenic diseases are understood to have low redundancy and weak 
robustness, and polygenic disorders are understood to have high redundancy and strong 
robustness. This explains why just a few genetic mutations can lead to the occurrence 
of Mendelian monogenic diseases while many mutations and environmental 
perturbations are necessary to trigger polygenic disorders; and it does so without 
compelling us to consider monogenic diseases to be “more genetic” than others.  
While one cannot assume that network medicine, a field in its infancy, has all 
the characteristics of a genetic theory of Disease, it seems promising. One issue that 
remains to be addressed is whether such a theory can be given a full and explicit 
mechanistic account, given the dynamic and complex relationships that exist between 
the different components of the functional modules and the interactions that exist 
between these functional modules and the different types of environmental background.  
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Conclusion 
As long as it is embedded in a misdirected quest to deem genes the most 
important causal factor in disease causation, the current geneticization of diseases 
cannot be interpreted as anything other than an unsatisfactory expression of 
genocentrism. This essay presents an alternative interpretation of geneticization, 
wherein a strong interactionist model underlies a unified mechanistic explanation for 
the genetic side of diseases.  
Despite being closer to a mechanism sketch than a full mechanistic model, the 
genetic theory of infectious diseases supports this reinterpretation. It unifies infectious 
diseases from a genetic point of view through the identification of common genetic 
mechanisms and achieves a better explanation of the pathogenesis of infectious diseases 
than the germ theory previously did, while acknowledging a multicausal model in 
disease explanation. 
Eventually, this genetic theory of infectious diseases may be considered a 
heuristic tool to imagine two different types of genetic theory. On the one hand, one 
would have a “genetic theory of diseases” as a set of regional genetic theories, where 
each category of disease could exhibit some specific mechanisms or where the same 
genetic mechanisms could apply to every category of disease. In this case, medicine 
would keep the same subclasses of diseases that are already in use (infectious diseases, 
autoimmune diseases, cardiovascular diseases, etc.). One would have a unified 
explanation for the genetics of each disease category but that would not change the 
conceptualization of disease. On the other hand, one could have a “genetic theory of 
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Disease” with a new genetic definition of disease and a reclassification of every disease 
into new disease categories. Network medicine might offer the conceptual framework 
for developing such a genetic theory of Disease. 
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